Vaudenay recently proposed a message authentication protocol which is interactive and based on short authenticated strings (SAS). We study here SASbased non-interactive message authentication protocols (NIMAP). We start by the analysis of two popular non-interactive message authentication protocols. The first one is based on a collision-resistant hash function and was presented by Balfanz et al. The second protocol is based on a universal hash function family and was proposed by Gehrmann, Mitchell, and Nyberg. It uses much less authenticated bits but requires a stronger authenticated channel. We propose a protocol which can achieve the same security as the first protocol but using less authenticated bits, without any stronger communication model, and without requiring a hash function to be collision-resistant. Finally, we demonstrate the optimality of our protocol.
Introduction
Message authentication protocols are typically used to exchange public keys so that secure communications can be set up. For a better usability, a noninteractive protocol is preferred. It should be noted that the protocol uses two separate channels. The first one is a broadband insecure channel (e.g. an email or a wireless channel) and the second one is a narrowband authenticated channel (e.g. authentication by a human voice or a manual authentication by a human operator).
In SSH and in GPG, the simple folklore protocol used to exchange public keys is presented in Balfanz et al. [BSSW02] . It is non-interactive and based on a collision-resistant hash function. The authenticated string is the k-bit hashed value of the input message m. We recall that this protocol is typically weak against offline attacks, such as birthday attacks, which have a complexity of 2 k/2 and that hash functions which resist to collision attacks are threatened species these days [BCJ + 05,WLF + 05, WYY05b, WYY05a, WY05] . For instance, it is possible to forge two different RSA keys with the same MD5 hash as shown in [LWdW05, LdW05] .
Another protocol is MANA I which was proposed by Gehrmann-MitchellNyberg [GMN04] . It is based on an universal hash function family. This protocol is more resistant against offline attacks since it uses an authenticated value which has a random part K. The second part is the hashed value (using K as key) of the input message m. The protocol requires to send the hashed value "at once". Hence, even if an adversary has an infinite complexity, his probability of success is at most 2 −k where k is the size of K and the size of the hash. However, the requirement renders the protocol "less non-interactive" by imposing a strong assumption on the communication model.
We propose a protocol which has the same security than the one presented by Balfanz et al. [BSSW02] but using less authenticated bits and without requiring the hash function to be collision-resistant. Our protocol is based on a trapdoor commitment scheme in the Common Reference String (CRS) model or in the Random Oracle model.
Finally, we propose a definition of the optimality of a message authentication protocol and we analyze the three above protocols.
Preliminaries
The considered model is a communication network made up of devices which use insecure broadband communication channels between them. In addition, they can use a narrowband channel which can be used to authenticate short messages, i.e. short authenticated strings (SAS). Communication devices are located on nodes n of given identity ID n and can run several instances which are formally denoted by a unique instance tag π i n . We concentrate on non-interactive message authentication protocols (NIMAP).
Adversarial Model against NIMAP
A message authentication protocol has an input m on the side of the claimant Alice of identity ID and an output ID||m on the side of the verifier Bob. Authentication is successful if the output is ID = ID andm = m. The protocol is non-interactive if it only uses messages send by Alice to Bob.
We assume that adversaries have full control on the broadband communication channel. Indeed, an attacker can read messages from the channel, he can prevent a message from being delivered, he can delay it, replay it, modify it, and change its recipient address. Here, we adopt the security model from Vaudenay [Vau05] based on Bellare-Rogaway [BR93] . The adversary has full control on which node launches a new instance of a protocol, on the input of the protocol, and on which protocol instance runs a new step of the protocol. Namely, we assume that the adversary has access to a launch(n, r, x) oracle where n is a node, r is a character, Alice or Bob, and x is the input. This oracle returns a unique instance tag π i n . Since a node can a priori run concurrent protocols, there may be several instances related to the same node n. The adversary also has access to the oracle receive(π i A ) which returns a message m which is meant to be sent to Bob and to the oracle send(π i B , m) which sends a message m to a given instance of Bob.
Typically, a NIMAP between nodes A and B with input m on the side of Alice and using two messages runs as follows.
By convention, we describe protocols by putting a hat on the notation for Bob's received messages (i.e. inputs of the send oracle) which are not authenticated since they can differ from Alice's sent messages (i.e. outputs of the receive oracle) in the case of an active attack.
On a global perspective, several launch(A k , Alice, m k ) and launch(B ℓ , Bob, / 0) can be queried. These queries create several π
instances of Alice (authentication claims) and several π j ℓ B ℓ instances of Bob (authentication verifications). We may have a perfect matching between the k's and ℓ's such that related instances have matching conversations which fully follow the protocol specifications, and the π j ℓ B ℓ ends with output ID A k ||m k for the matching k. In any other case, we say that an attack occurred. We say that an attack is successful if there exists at least an instance π j ℓ B ℓ which terminated and output ID||m such that there is no k for which ID = ID A k andm = m k . Note that many protocol instances can endlessly stay in an unterminated state or turn in an abort state. We call one-shot attacks the attacks which launch a single instance of Alice and Bob. The attack cost is measured by -the number Q of launched instances of Alice, i.e. the online complexity.
-the additional complexity C, i.e. the offline complexity. -the probability of success p.
Here is a useful lemma taken from [Vau05] . Assuming that no adversary running a one-shot attack has a probability of success larger than p, using Lemma 1, we can upper bound the probability of success of an attack which uses Q A , resp. Q B , instances of Alice, resp. Bob, by Q A Q B p.
Authenticated Channels
When referring to "channel", we refer by default to an insecure broadband channel without any assumption. As mentioned before, the devices can use an authenticated channel. An authenticated channel is related to a node identity ID. Formally, an authenticated channel from a node n has an identifier ID n . It allows the recipient of a message to know the identity of the node from which the message has been sent as is. Note that an adversary cannot modify it (i.e. integrity is implicitly protected), but she can delay it, remove it, or replay it, and of course, read it. Precisely, an authenticated channel does not provide confidentiality. By convention, we denote authenticate ID n (x) a message x which has been sent from node n through the authenticated channel.
The receive oracle maintains unordered sets of authenticated messages in every channel ID n from node n. Only receive oracles with a π i n instance can insert a new message in this set. When a send oracle is queried with any message authenticate ID n (x), it is accepted by the oracle only if x is in the set related to channel ID n . Note that concurrent or successive instances related to the same node write in the same channel, i.e. in the same set. Thus, when an instance of Alice sends a message, Bob can only authenticate the node from which it has been sent, i.e. n, but not the connection to the right instance. Weak Authenticated Channels. By default, authenticated channels without any other assumption are called weak. This means that an adversary can delay a message, remove it, or replay it. In particular, the owner of the message has not the insurance that the message has been delivered to the recipient.
Stronger Authenticated Channels. In some cases we need special assumptions on the authenticated channel. We can consider stronger authentication channels, namely channels in which additional properties are achieved as proposed by Vaudenay [Vau05] . In the following, we use one possible property that can be assumed on a stronger authentication channel. A stall-free transmission assumes that when a message is released by a receive oracle either it is used as input in the immediately following send oracle query or it is never used. Namely, we cannot wait for a new message from Alice before delivering the authenticated message to Bob.
For instance, a face to face conversation and a telephone call are clearly authenticated channels. When one talks to the other one, the recipient further knows that the message has not been recorded since interactivity implies coherent conversations (stall-free). Mail, e-mail, and voice mail can be stalled and released in a different order. Note that an e-mail without any cryptographic appendix such as a GPG signature is in fact not an authenticated channel since it can easily be forged.
Hash Functions

Collision-Resistant Hash Functions (CRHF).
A collision-resistant hash function is a hash function in which it should be hard to find two inputs x and y such that H(x) = H(y) and x = y. Due to the birthday attacks, the hash length must be at least of 160 bits. 
Universal Hash Functions Families (UHFF).
An ε-universal hash function family is a collection of functions H K from a message space to a finite set {0, 1} k which depends on a random parameter K such that for any x = y we have
where the probability is over the random selection of K.
Commitment Schemes
We can formalize a commitment scheme by two algorithms commit and open. 
The scheme is (T, ε)-semantically binding if any adversaries A bounded by a complexity T has a probability to find two decommit values d and d ′ which is at most ε. Trapdoor Commitment Model. The notion of trapdoor commitment was introduced by Brassard, Chaum, and Crepeau [BCC88] . We define (T, ε)-trapdoor commitment schemes by four algorithms setup, commit, open, and equivocate. The first three work as before. The algorithm equivocate defeats the binding property by using the secret key K s . More precisely, for any
-for any m, anyĉ, and anyd ← equivocate(K s , m,ĉ), the open(K p ,ĉ,d) algorithm yields m. -for any adversary bounded by a complexity T in the SB game, the winning probability is smaller than ε.
Note that this primitive is a particular case of strongly equivocable commitment as described by Damgård-Groth [DG03] . Trapdoor commitment schemes are perfectly hiding and computationnaly binding commitment schemes. Note that for any (K p , K s ) and any m, the distribution of (c, d), which has been yield using the commit algorithm, is equal to the distribution of (ĉ,d), which have been yield choosing aĉ with uniform distribution and using the equivocate algorithm.
For instance, a trapdoor commitment based on the discrete logarithm problem was proposed by Boyar and Kurtz [BK90] . Another trapdoor commitment scheme was proposed by Catalano et al. [CGHGN01] based on the Paillier's trapdoor permutation [Pai99] . The proposed scheme uses an RSA modulus N = pq and a value h ∈ Z N 2 such that its order is a multiple of N. The public key is K p = (N, h) and the private key is K s = (p, q). Note that the authenticated string is constant for all instances of the protocol which use the same input m, i.e. the authenticated string is H(m). This characteristic allows adversaries to run completely offline attacks. An attacker has simply to find a collision on the hash function between two messages m 1 and m 2 and then succeeds with probability 1. Fig. 4 using weak authentication. We denote by T , Q, and p the time complexity, number of oracle queries launch, and probability of success of adversaries, respectively. There is a generic transformation which transforms any adversary into a collision finder on H whose complexity is T + µQ and probability of success is p.
Theorem 2 ([Vau05]). Let µ be the overall time complexity of the message authentication protocol in
In short, the best known offline attack against this protocol is the collision attack. An adversary has a probability of success of 1 − e − 1 2 T 2 2 −k by using T hashes computations. It clearly succeeds for T = O (2 k/2 ). Collision resistance requires the number of authenticated bits to be at least 160 and cannot be reduced considering offline attacks and using only weak authentication.
A NIMAP with Strong Authentication
The Gehrmann-Mitchell-Nyberg MANA I [GMN04] protocol is depicted in Fig. 5 . 1 MANA I uses a universal hash function family H. Proposed constructions lead to 16-20 bit long SAS values but require strong authentication. Indeed, using weak authentication, an adversary who gets authenticate(K||µ) has enough time to find a messagem such that µ = H K (m) and to substitute m withm. We can also achieve security with a stronger authenticated channel which achieves stall-free transmissions. 
Theorem 3. Given an ε-universal hash function family H, any adversary which is bounded by a complexity T and by Q A (resp. Q B ) instances of Alice (resp. Bob) against the protocol of Fig. 5 using stall-free authentication has a probability of success at most Q A Q B ε.
Proof. A one-shot adversary has no advantage to sendm before it has received m and he cannot sendm after K||µ is released. Indeed, he would not be able to sendm after receiving K||µ due to the stall-free assumption. Thus, the attacker must select m andm and hope that H K (m) = H K (m). Clearly, the assumption on H limits the probability of success to ε. Now, consider powerful adversaries. Using Lemma 1, we can deduce that the probability of success of an adversary is at most Q A Q B ε.
⊓ ⊔
A Proposed NIMAP with Weak Authentication
Consider the protocol depicted on deterministic commitment scheme is the heart of the protocol since an attacker cannot predict the c value and thus cannot predict the H(c) value which is the authenticated one.
Lemma 4. Consider the message authentication protocol depicted in Fig. 6. We assume that the function H is a (T + µ, ε h )-weakly collision resistant hash function and the commitment scheme is a (T + µ, ε c )-trapdoor commitment scheme in the CRS model (resp. oracle commitment scheme). There exists a (small) constant µ such that for any T , any one-shot adversary against this message authentication protocol with complexity bounded by T has a probability of success p smaller than
Recall that the c value is sent through the insecure broadband channel and thus has not to be minimized. Thus, we can use an ε c as small as desired since we can use any commitment scheme as secure as desired.
Assuming that H is optimally WCR, the best WCR attack using T hash computations has a probability of success ε h ≈ 1 − e −T 2 −k . So, we need T = Ω(2 k ) to succeed with a one-shot attack. Thus, using the same amount of authenticated bits as the protocol of Fig. 4 , our protocol has a better resistance against offline attacks. Equivalently, we can achieve the same security as the protocol of Fig. 4 , but using only half amount of authenticated bits, e.g. 80 bits.
Proof. A one-shot adversary A against the protocol in Fig. 6 follows the game depicted on Fig. 7(a) in which it runs a man-in-the middle attack. Clearly, it can be reduced to an adversary A who plays the game described in Fig. 7(b) .
Assume a one-shot adversary A bounded by a complexity T . Given c, the adversary A has to find aĉ such that H(ĉ) = H(c). In addition, it must find ad which opens tom (usingĉ) which is different from the input m. He can of course choose aĉ either equal or either different to c. We study the two cases. 
Case 1. (ĉ = c) The adversary A choosesĉ equal to c and obviously fulfills the condition H(ĉ) = H(c). As depicted on Fig. 8, we can reduce the adversary
A to an adversary against the binding game of Fig. 6 . We use an algorithm B bounded by complexity µ which plays the binding game with a challenger C on one side and simulates a challenger for A on the other side at the same time. Using adversary A and algorithm B , we construct an adversary A B which plays the binding game. Note that adversary A B has a complexity bounded by T + µ.
First, the challenger C generates the pair of keys (K p , K S ) and sends K p to B . B sends it to A and receives a message m from A . He computes (c, d) using the commit function with K p and sends c||d to A . As assumed, A chooses aĉ equal to c and also sendsĉ||d to B . B can now deducem using the open function with inputs c andd. Finally, B sends all required values to the challenger C . Note that B simulates perfectly a challenger for A . Hence, A and A B win their respective game at the same time. Consequently, both win with the same probability of success. Recall that the probability of success of an adversary bounded by a complexity T + µ against the binding game of Fig. 6 is smaller than ε c when the commitment scheme is a (T + µ, ε c )-trapdoor commitment. Hence, the probability that A succeeds and c =ĉ is at most ε c .
Note that this case equally applies to trapdoor commitment schemes. Note that B simulates perfectly a challenger for A . Hence, A and A B win their respective game at the same time and consequently with the same probability of success. Recall that the probability of success of an adversary against a second preimage game bounded by a complexity T + µ is smaller than ε h when H is a (T + µ, ε h )-weakly collision-resistant hash function.
A B C
Hence, the probability that A succeeds and c =ĉ is at most ε h . Note that the proof equally applies to oracle commitment schemes since it is unlikely that the challenge c was output by a commit oracle.
We conclude that any one-shot adversary bounded by a complexity T against the protocol of Fig. 6 has a probability of success smaller than ε c + ε h when the protocol uses a (T + µ, ε h )-weakly collision resistant hash function H and a (T + µ, ε c )-trapdoor commitment scheme.
We consider now powerful adversaries.
Theorem 5. Consider the message authentication protocol of Fig. 6. We assume that the function H is a (T + µ, ε h )-weakly collision resistant hash function and the commitment scheme is a (T +µ, ε c )-trapdoor commitment scheme in the CRS model (resp. oracle commitment scheme). There exists a (small) constant µ such that for any T , any adversary against this message authentication protocol with complexity bounded by T and with number of Alice's (resp. Bob's) instances bounded by Q A (resp. Q B ) has a probability of success p at most Q A (ε h + ε c ).
Assuming that WCR hash functions and trapdoor commitments such that
As an example, assuming that an adversary is limited to Q A ≤ 2 10 , T ≤ 2 70 , and that the security level requires p ≤ 2 −20 , the protocol of Fig. 4 requires k ≥ 160 and our protocol requires k ≥ 100. Using MD5 [Riv92] , our protocol still achieves a quite luxurious security even though collisions have been found on MD5 [WY05] .
Proof. Consider an adversary who launches Q A instances of Alice and Q B instances of Bob. Clearly, we can simulate all instances of Bob, pick one who will make the attack succeed, and launch only this one. Hence, we reduce to Q B = 1.
Recall from Lemma 4 that any one-shot adversary has a probability of success smaller than ε h + ε c . Using Lemma 1, we conclude that any adversary has a probability of success at most Q A (ε h + ε c ). ⊓ ⊔
On the Required Entropy of Authenticated Communications
Using a weak authenticated channel, adversaries can delay or replay authenticated messages. With non-interactive protocols an adversary can run the catalog attack: i.e. he launches several instances of Alice and recover many authenticated SAS. He launches one Bob and use one SAS of the catalog. We would like to upper bound the security of an arbitrary message authentication protocol given the amount of authenticated strings it uses. Assume that the protocol is used between Alice and Bob. We suppose that the protocol can use any sequence of authenticated messages in a given set S during the protocol. We call it a transcript. Note that authenticated strings are interleaved with regular messages which are not represented in the transcript. For any input message m, the used transcript during a protocol instance is picked in the set S of all possible transcripts with a distribution D m . Proof. We consider a general man-in-the-middle attack in which the adversary first picks m ∈ U {0, 1} t andm ∈ U {0, 1} t and launches Alice with input m. The attack runs synchronized protocols between Alice and a simulator for Bob, and a simulator for Alice with inputm and Bob. Following the attack, every authenticated message which must be sent by the simulator is replaced by an authenticated message which has just been received by the simulator.
Let SAS m be the (random) sequence of all authenticated strings (the transcript) which would be exchanged in the protocol between Alice and the simulator if the simulator where honest, and SASm be the similar sequence between the simulator and Bob. Clearly, if SASm = SAS m , the attack succeeds. Note that an attack makes sense only ifm is different of m.
We have If the distribution of all SAS is uniform, we have a birthday effect and thus the probability of success is approximately 1 − e − T ·Q A s . When the distribution is not uniform, the probability is even larger (see Appendix B of [Pas05] ).
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 6 says that there exists a one-shot attack against any message authentication protocol which succeeds with probability essentially 1 s where s is the size of S. Theorem 7 says that there exists a generic attack against any NIMAP which uses a weak authenticated channel which succeeds with probability essentially 1 − e
where Q A is the number of instances of Alice used. Hence, they cannot be secure unless T · Q A is negligible against s. Thus, any NIMAP which is secure for T · Q A ≪ s is optimal.
Consequently, our proposed protocol is optimal due to Theorem 5 provided that WCR hash functions and trapdoor commitment schemes such that ε c ≪ ε h = O (T 2 −k ) exist. By comparison with our protocol, we can note that the protocol of Fig. 4 is not optimal.
Applications
One key issue in cryptography is to setup secure communications over insecure channels, such as Internet. We know that using public key cryptography it is possible by exchanging public keys in an authenticated way. The proposed protocol is used in this case for public key authentications, e.g. GPG public keys. Typical applications where public key cryptography is used, and consequently public key authentication is required, are -distant hosts authentication, e.g. SSH -e-mail authentication, e.g. GPG signature -secure e-mail, e.g. GPG encryption -secure voice over IP, e.g. PGPfone
Another possible application can be authentication of legal documents. For instance, if two persons would exchange a document without complex appendix, such as GPG signature, they can simply send the corresponding commit and decommit values and then authenticate the hashed commit value. The recipient can check whether or not it is correct. Note that integrity is protected.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a new non-interactive message authentication protocol based on a commitment scheme. It has the same security as the currently used in SSH against one-shot attacks but using only half authenticated bits, e.g. 80 bits. 100 bits only are required against more general attacks. Indeed, due to the commitment scheme, the authenticated value is not foreseeable and the protocol is resistant to collision attacks. The latter theorem proposes that our protocol is optimal. We can in addition conclude on the non-optimality of the protocol used today, but the question about MANA I is still opened. Finally, we stress that the security of our protocol relies essentially on the hardness of the SB game of the commitment scheme and on the hardness on the WCR game of the hash function.
